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JURISDICTION
This Petition is based on a final order of the Utah
State

Tax

Commission

("Commission")

following

a

formal

adjudicative proceeding. Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court
has

jurisdiction

in this matter

pursuant

to Utah

Code

Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii) (1992). The Utah Court of
Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter by virtue of the
Supreme Court's authority to transfer this matter to the Utah
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4)
(1992) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

Issue: Did the Commission err when it interpreted Utah
Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) to mean that certain
establishments
engaged
in
"manufacturing"
may
nevertheless be excluded from the definition of
"manufacturing facilities" in applying Utah's sales tax
exemption on purchases of manufacturing equipment?
Standard of Review; This issue presents a question of
law for which the Commission's decision is reviewed
under a correction-of-error standard, giving no
deference to the Commission's decision. Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1989); Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing
Div., 814 P.2d 581, 587 (Utah 1991).

II.

Issue; Did the Commission erroneously apply its own
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) to the
facts of this case?
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of
law for which the Commission's decision is reviewed
under a correction-of-error standard, giving no
deference to the Commission's decision. Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1989); Morton Int'l. Inc. v. Auditing
Div., 814 P.2d 581, 587 (Utah 1991).

III. Issue: Did the Commission abuse its discretion, if any
existed, to interpret Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15)
when it interpreted that statute to mean that certain
equipment purchased and used in "manufacturing"
1

activities are ineligible
whose
purpose
was
to
manufacturing equipment?

for a sales tax exemption
encourage
investment
in

Standard of Review: The Commission's exercise of
discretion in interpreting specific statutory terms is
reviewed for reasonableness. The Commission abuses this
discretion when its action—viewed in the context of the
language and purpose of the statute—is unreasonable.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i) (1989); Morton
Int'l. Inc. v. Auditing Div. , 814 P. 2d 581, 587 (Utah
1991).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
I.

Statutes

The sales tax exemption
provides in relevant part:
59-12-104.

at

issue

on

this

Petition

Exemptions

The following sales and uses are exempt from the
taxes imposed by this chapter:
. . .

(15) Sales or leases of machinery and
equipment purchased or leased by a manufacturer for
use in new or expanding operations (excluding
normal operating replacements, which includes
replacement machinery and equipment even though
they may increase plant production or capacity, as
determined by the commission) in any manufacturing
facility in Utah. Manufacturing facility means an
establishment described in SIC Codes 2000 to 3999
of the Standard Industrial Classification Manual
1972, of the federal Executive Office of the
President, Office of Management and Budget. For
purposes of this subsection, the commission shall
by rule define "new or expanding operations11 and
"establishment."
By October 1, 1991, and every
five years thereafter, the commission shall review
this exemption and make recommendations to the
Revenue and Taxation Interim Committee concerning
whether
the
exemption
should
be continued,
modified, or repealed.
In its report to the
Revenue and Taxation Interim Committee, the tax
commission review shall include at least:
(a) the cost of the exemption;
(b) the
purpose
and
effectiveness
of
exemption; and

the

(c)

the benefits of the exemption to the state.

Utah Code Ann, § 59-12-104(15) (1987 & Supp. 1991).
The Commission is reviewable pursuant
Administrative Procedures Act as follows:
63-46b-16.
proceedings

Judicial

Review—Formal

to

the

Utah

adjudicative

(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court
or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review
all final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings.

(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only
if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines
that a person seeking judicial review has been
substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule
on which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional
on its face or as applied;
(b) the
agency
has
acted
beyond
the
jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the
issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful
procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to
follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were
illegally constituted as a decision-making body or were
subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a
determination of fact, made or implied by the agency,
that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i)
an
abuse
of
the
discretion
delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior
practice,
unless
the
agency
justifies
the
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989).
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Qth*r
Executive Office of the President, Office of Management,
and Budget, Standard Industrial Classification Manual
1972, Division D, at 57-218, Division I, at 295-334
(1972) (reproduced at Item 2 of Addendum attached).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature Of The Case
This

Petition

is

brought

by

Bonneville

International Corporation ("Bonneville") from a final decision
of the Commission following a formal adjudicative proceeding.
The proceedings spawning this Petition began on
November 13, 1990.
advisory

opinion

application
manufacturing

of

a

Bonneville at that time requested an
from

the

Commission

sales

tax

exemption

by

two

equipment

December

3,

1990, the

to

Commission

the

purchases

Bonneville

Bonneville Communications and Video West.
On

concerning

of

divisions,

[Record at 96-97]
issued

an opinion

indicating that none of the subject equipment purchases were
eligible for the sales tax exemption set forth in Utah Code
Annotated 59-12-104(15) (1987 & Supp. 1991).
95].

[Record at 94-

Bonneville filed a Petition for Redetermination before

the Commission on January 24, 1991. A formal hearing was held
before an Administrative Law Judge on February 4, 1992. After
that hearing, the Commission

and Bonneville agreed that

Bonneville's Petition for Redetermination may be treated as a
claim for refund of sales taxes paid.

[Record at 12-13].

On September 2, 1992, the Commission issued its
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision. The
Commission there reaffirmed its previous declaratory order
denying Bonneville the sales tax exemption on its equipment
purchases. Bonneville now brings this Petition for Review of
5

Final Agency Action seeking review of the Commission's Final
Decision.
II*

Relevant Facts
Bonneville is a Utah corporation engaged in radio

and television broadcasting.

The two Bonneville divisions at

the core of this controversy, Bonneville Communications and
Video West, are engaged in the manufacturing and reproduction
of

audio

divisions

tapes

and video

perform

tapes respectively.

their

assembly,

The two

duplication,

and

distribution activities at two distinct locations that are
separate and apart from each other and from Bonneville and its
other divisions. Bonneville Communications and Video West are
separate

cost

centers

within

Bonneville

with

their own

processes

of

Bonneville

separate financial statements.
The

manufacturing

Communications and Video West are substantially the same. The
primary

distinction

between

the

two

divisions

is

that

Bonneville Communications manufactures reproduced audio tapes,
while Video West manufactures reproduced video tapes.
In an effort to expand their existing operations,
both Bonneville Communications and Video West have purchased
and now use numerous pieces of machinery and equipment in
their manufacturing processes.

Bonneville paid Utah sales

taxes on the purchases of that equipment.
Bonneville has requested that the Commission rule
that Bonneville is entitled to a refund of the sales taxes

paid

on

purchases

of

equipment

used

by

Bonneville

Communications and Video West, Curiously, the Commission has
allowed the exemption for Bonneville Communications but not
for Video West.
stipulated

that

manufacturing

In so doing,
Bonneville

reproduced

the Commission

Communications'

audio

tapes

properly

activities of

qualify

it

as

a

"manufacturing facility" and that its purchases of equipment
fall within the exemption provided for in Utah Code Annotated
Section 59-12-104(15).

[Record at 14-17].

The Commission

also stipulated that Video West is a "manufacturer engaged in
the reproduction of video tapes."

[Record at 67].

Despite the Commission's own admissions about the
similarities between Bonneville Communications and Video West,
the Commission has denied a sales tax exemption for purchases
of Video West equipment. Although the Commission acknowledges
that

Video

Commission

West's
somehow

activities
theorizes

are
that

"manufacturing,"
Video

West

the

is not a

"manufacturing facility" as that term is used in Section 5912-104(15) . The Commission apparently believes that while the
sales

tax

exemption

statute

allows

the

exemption

for

manufacturers of audio tapes, it simultaneously disallows the
exemption for manufacturers of video tapes.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In this case, the Commission misinterpreted the
sales tax exemption provided for in Section 59-12-104(15) by
denying the exemption to Video West even though the Commission
7

agrees that Video West is a "manufacturer."

Although the

exemption provides that the term "manufacturing facility" is
to include establishments whose activities are included in SIC
Codes 2000 through 3999, the Commission has missed the import
of the Legislature's intent by using that reference.

SIC

Codes 2000 through 3999 are the range of codes included in
Subdivision

"D"

of

the

SIC

Manual

1972

entitled

"Manufacturing." Accordingly, the Commission should recognize
that the Legislature's reference to Codes 2000 through 3999
was

intended

as

a

shorthand

way

of

saying

that

any

establishment involved in a "manufacturing" activity qualifies
for the exemption.

But the Commission does not so read the

exemption statute.

Instead, the Commission believes that a

"manufacturing" activity may nevertheless be excluded from the
exemption if the activity seems to fall within a SIC Code
description outside those included in 2000 through 3999. The
Commission consequently concludes—based on a tortured reading
of the SIC Manual—that video tape reproduction falls within
one

of

the

SIC

Manual's

"service"

descriptions.

This

conclusion can only charitably be characterized as incongruous
in view of the fact that the Commission previously stipulated
that Video West is engaged in "manufacturing." The Commission
has plainly erred in interpreting the statute in such a way
that a "manufacturer" can fail to qualify for the exemption.
Even if the Commission's
statute

is

correct,

however,

its

interpretation of the
application

of

that

interpretation to the facts of this case is wrong. Using the
Commission's own methodology of looking first at the Code
description

without

regard

to

whether

the

activity

is

"manufacturing11 or "service" leads to a different result than
the Commission

reached.

The Commission

did

not accept

Bonneville's argument that video tape reproduction falls
within Code 3652 which includes the description "manufacturing
phonograph records and pre-recorded magnetic tape." Rather,
the Commission concluded that video tape reproduction falls
within Code 7819.

That code description falls within the

"Services" subdivision of the Manual, and includes "services"
allied to the motion picture industry.

The Commission's

conclusion that video tape reproduction is more likely to fit
within Code 7819 than Code 3652 is not supported by the
language of the descriptions.

Code 7819 is a service code

clearly designed to include Hollywood-style movie making and
services allied thereto. In contrast, Code 3652 contains the
phrase "pre-recorded magnetic tape."
product

that

Video

West

This is precisely the

manufactures

for

wholesale

distribution.
Finally, the Commission has not been granted any
discretion to define the term "manufacturing facility" as it
is used in Section 59-12-104(15). Even if the Commission has
been granted such discretion, the Commission's decision in
this case is an abuse of that discretion.
its

discretion

when

its

interpretation

Any agency abuses
of

a

statutory

9

provision is unreasonable in light of the clear purpose of the
statute.

The exemption, of course, is clearly intended to

encourage investment in new manufacturing facilities in Utah.
The Commission should accordingly interpret the statute in
such

a way

as to

effectuate

that

plain

purpose.

Commission, however, has done precisely the opposite.

The
It has

interpreted the statute such that Video West's new investment
in manufacturing equipment does not qualify for the exemption.
Contrary

to

the

Legislature's

purpose,

therefore,

the

Commission has discouraged investment in Utah facilities to
manufacture reproduced video tapes.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Commission Erroneously Interpreted The Sales Tax
Exemption Statute By Concluding That Video Tape
Reproduction Necessarily Falls Within The ,fServicesM
Division
Of
The
SIC
Manual
Instead
Of
The
"Manufacturing" Division.
A.

The Commission's Interpretation of Section 5912-104(15) Presents a Question of Law Subject
to De Novo Review by This Court.
The relevant facts in this case are not in dispute.

The

Commission's

decision

was

based

purely

on

its

interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) (1992) and
its application of that provision to the facts. Accordingly,
this petition presents the question of whether the Commission
properly

interpreted

and

applied

the

uncontroverted facts previously described.

statute

to

the

Under the Utah

Administrative Procedures Act (the "UAPA"), this Court may
grant the relief sought by Bonneville if "it determines that

[Bonneville] has been substantially prejudiced by any of the
following: . . . (d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1989).
The quoted portion of Section 63-46b-16 has been
construed to mean that an agency's interpretation of statutory
provisions is to be reviewed under a "correction of error
standard, giving no deference to the agency['s] decision[]."
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 587 (Utah
1991); Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d
664, 668-71 (Utah 1991).

Thus,

f,/

a court may decide that the

agency has erroneously interpreted the law if the court merely
disagrees with the agency's interpretation./>f

Morton, 814

P.2d at 587 (emphasis added); Savage Indus., 811 P.2d at 670
(quoting Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 5-116
comment, 15 U.L.A. 128 (1981)).
The Commission's application of the law to the
facts presents a question of law likewise subject to the de
novo standard of review. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in
Morton, "in granting judicial relief when an 'agency has
erroneously interpreted or applied the law,' the language of
section 63-46b-16(4) clearly indicates that absent a grant of
discretion,1

a

correction-of-error

standard

is

used

in

1

Nothing in the language of Section 59-12-104(15) indicates
an explicit or implicit grant of discretion to the Commission in
interpreting the scope of the exemption as it relates to the
present case.
Of course, the statute expressly grants the
Commission discretion in defining the terms "new or expanding
operations" and "establishment." Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15)
(1987 & Supp. 1991). In this case, the Commission does not dispute
11

reviewing an agency's interpretation or application of a
statutory term."
B.

Morton, 814 P.2d at 588 (emphasis added).

The Commission Misinterprets the Meaning of
Section 59-12-104(15) and its Decision Must be
Reversed.
The Commission's divergent treatment of Bonneville

Communications and Video West underscores the Commission's
misunderstanding of Section 59-12-104(15). No rational system
of taxation would classify the manufacture of audio tapes as
a

"manufacturing"

activity

and

allow

an

exemption,

and

simultaneously classify the manufacture of video tapes as a
"service" and disallow the same exemption.

This approach,

however, is precisely what the Commission has engaged in here.
The Legislature could not have intended such an inconsistent
and irrational application of the sales tax exemption.
To unmask the Commission's misinterpretation of the
statute in question, one must begin by fairly reading the
language of the statute itself. Section 59-12-104 sets forth

that Video West is an "establishment," and there is likewise no
dispute over whether Video West's equipment purchases were for use
in "new or expanding operations."
This case presents issues
relating only to the Commission's interpretation of the meaning of
the
terms
"manufacturing
facility"
and
"manufacturer."
Consequently, the standard of review in this case is the
correction-of-error
standard both as to the Commission's
interpretation of the statute and as to its application of the
statute to the facts presented.
Should this Court disagree with Bonneville and decide that
the Commission has been granted some discretion in the
interpretation of the terms "manufacturing
facility" and
"manufacturer," Bonneville nevertheless believes the Commission s
decision in this case would constitute an abuse of that discretion.
See infra Section III.
i o

a number of sales that are exempt from Utah's Sales and Use
Tax Act, Subsection (15) provides an exemption for "sales or
leases of equipment purchased or leased by a manufacturer for
use in new or expanding operations . . . in any manufacturing
facility in Utah."
(emphasis added).

Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) (1992)
In this case, the Commission does not

dispute that Video West's activities and operations qualify it
as a "manufacturer engaged
tapes."

in the reproduction of video

[Record at 67].
The Commission's decision to deny Video West the

exemption

relates to

its interpretation

of the sentence

following the language quoted above. That sentence of former
Section 59-12-104(15)2 defines "manufacturing facility" as
follows:

"Manufacturing

facility

means

an

establishment

described in SIC Codes 2000 to 3999 of the Standard Industrial
Classification Manual 1972, of the federal Executive Office of
the President, Office of Management and Budget."
Ann. § 59-12-104(15) (1987 & Supp. 1991).

Utah Code

Relying on this

language, the Commission construes Section 59-12-104(15) to
mean

that

equipment

purchased

for

the

manufacture

of

reproduced video tapes can only be exempt if the manufacture

2

Former Section 59-12-104(15) was amended in 1992 to convert
the statute's reference to the Standard Industrial Classification
Manual ("SIC Manual") from the 1972 version to the 1987 version.
See 1992 Utah Laws ch. 298, § 2. In this case, the sales at issue
took place well before the 1992 amendment. For purposes of this
Petition, therefore, the definition of "manufacturing facility" is
as set forth in former section 59-12-104(15) by reference to the
1972 SIC Manual.
13

of such reproduced tapes falls within one of the SIC Codes
from 2000 to 3999.
The Commission's interpretation leads it to engage
in a ill-fated, two-step inquiry.

First, the Commission asks

which SIC Code the taxpayer's activity most easily fits into
without regard to whether the activity is a "manufacturing"
activity or a "service" activity. Second, the Commission asks
whether the SIC Code it has identified as the most likely one
falls within Codes 2000 to 3999.
denied the exemption.

If not, the taxpayer is

This analysis leads the Commission to

apply the exemption in an irrational way.
Adhering to its own methodology, the Commission
simply set out to determine which SIC Code it believed most
closely described Video West's activities.

The Commission

rejected Bonneville's argument that Video West's manufacture
of reproduced video tapes logically falls within SIC Code 3652
which

is

entitled

"Phonograph

Records

and

Pre-recorded

Magnetic Tape." This code includes establishments engaged in
"manufacturing phonograph records and pre-recorded magnetic
tape."

Executive

Office

of

the

President,

Office

of

Management and Budget, Standard Industrial Classification
Manual 1972 190 (1972) ("SIC Manual 1972").

Instead, the

Commission concluded that the manufacture of reproduced video
tapes falls within the SIC Code 7819 which includes activities
described as follows:

7819 Services Allied to Motion Picture Production
Establishments
primarily
engaged
in
performing services independent of motion
picture production but allied thereto, such
as motion picture film processing, editing
and titling? casting bureaus; wardrobe and
studio property rental; television tape
services (editing, transfers, etc.); and
stock footage film libraries.
SIC Manual 1972 at 315 (emphasis added).
Under the Commission's interpretation of Section
59-12-104(15), a taxpayer can be engaged in an activity that
the Commission agrees is clearly "manufacturing," but may
nevertheless be excluded from the statutory definition of
"manufacturing facility."

If the Commission determines that

the manufacturer's activity is somehow mentioned or described
by

a one of the non-manufacturing

legislative

exemption

for

SIC Codes, then the

equipment

purchased

for

"manufacturing facilities" does not apply.
Bonneville submits that a rational interpretation
of Section 59-12-104(15) in light of its purpose is demanded.
The purpose for creating this exemption for purchases of new
equipment used for manufacturing in Utah is diamond clear.
The Legislature obviously sought to create incentives (or at
least remove any disincentives caused by the sales tax) toward
investment by "manufacturers" in "manufacturing facilities" in
Utah.

Only with this purpose in mind can Section 59-12-

104(15) be interpreted properly.
Viewed in this way, the Legislature's definition of
"manufacturing facility" as any establishment described by SIC
15

Codes 2000 through 3999 takes on a meaning much different from
the one on which the Commission has settled-

Instead of

limiting the exemption to some manufacturers to be chosen
according to the arbitrary application of the SIC Codes by the
Commission, the Legislature intended that the exemption would
apply to all manufacturers who purchase new equipment for use
in Utah.
This intent is evident when one considers the way
in which the Legislature defined "manufacturing facility."
The Legislature's definition of "manufacturing facility" as
any establishment described by SIC Codes 2000 to 3999 is
simply a shorthand way of expressing its intent to include all
establishments

engaged

in

described as "manufacturing."
divided

into many

activities

that

properly

Indeed, the SIC Manual 1972 is

"Divisions" one of which

"Division D, Manufacturing."

are

is entitled

Not coincidentally. Division D

of the Manual consists of Codes 2000 to 3999—the precise
range of codes used by the Legislature in its definition of
"manufacturing facility." In fact, "Division D" of the Manual
is prefaced by a comment in which the drafters of the Manual
define the scope of Division D as follows:
The
manufacturing
division
includes
establishments engaged in the mechanical or
chemical transformation of materials or substances
into new products.
These establishments are
usually described as plants, factories, or mills
and characteristically use power driven machines
and materials handling equipment. Establishments
engaged
in
assembling
component
parts of
manufactured
products
are
also
considered

manufacturing if the new product is neither a
structure nor other fixed improvement•
SIC Manual 1972 at 57.
The Legislature's obvious intent when it defined
"manufacturing facility" by reference to Codes 2000 to 3999
was to insure that all establishments engaged in activities
properly described as "manufacturing" would be eligible for
the exemption.

As discussed above, the Commission does not

dispute that Video West's video tape reproduction business is
"manufacturing."

Yet, the Commission's interpretation of the

statute led it to conclude that Video West's activities are
best described by a SIC Code found in "Division I" of the
Manual

entitled

ineligible

"Services" thereby

for the exemption.

rendering

Video West

The Commission's

slavish

attention to descriptions contained in the twenty-year old
Manual has frustrated the Legislature's policy of encouraging
investment

in

facilities

that

are

clearly

engaged

in

manufacturing. One must recognize that in 1972 the videotape
duplication industry did not exist. Of course, neither did a
whole host of other new industries that clearly involve
manufacturing. Instead of recognizing these facts in applying
the exemption, the Commission chooses to hide behind the
inherent limitations of the 1972 SIC Code descriptions and
uses those descriptions to limit the scope of the exemption in
an irrational way.
A reasoned interpretation of Section 59-12-104(15)
would

have

the

Commission

determine

first

whether

the
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taxpayer's

activities

are

properly

described

as

"manufacturing." Because the Legislature has defined the term
"manufacturing facility" by reference to Division D of the SIC
Manual 1972, the Commission should look to the beginning of
the Manual's Division D in making this determination.
the taxpayer

is clearly engaged

When

in an activity that is

properly described as "manufacturing" within the definition
used at the beginning of Division D, the Commission should
conclude that the taxpayer's establishment is a "manufacturing
facility" within the meaning of Section 59-12-104(15).

Once

that determination is made, the question of which SIC Code
within

Division

D applies

is less

important.

What

is

important, is that the Commission should not seek to force a
square peg into a round hole by categorizing an admitted
manufacturing process into a service code simply to limit the
application of the exemption.

If, as in this case, there is

no manufacturing Code that expressly includes the activity in
question, the Commission should simply apply the manufacturing
Code that most closely describes that activity.
The Commission's denial of the exemption in the
case of Video West is contrary to the Legislature's intent and
purpose to encourage investment in manufacturing facilities.
The Commission's decision in this case amounts to nothing more
than an attempt to deny a taxpayer a valid exemption based on
a wooden reading of an out-dated SIC Manual.

Because the

Commission's decision in this case was based on an erroneous

1 O

interpretation

of

Section

59-12-104(15),

the

denial

of

Bonneville's request for refund must be reversed.
II.

The Commission Also Erred In The Application Of Section
59-12-104(15) To The Undisputed Facts Of This Case.
A correct interpretation of Section 59-12-104(15)

in light of its true purposes would lead the Commission to a
different result when applied to the facts of this case. In
any event, the Commission's application of the statute to the
facts of this case was erroneous.
A.

Even if the Commission's Interpretation of the
Statute Was Correct, it Erred in its
Application of the Statute to These Facts.
As the UAPA makes clear, the application of a

statute is also a question of law subject to the correctionof-error standard of review.

See Morton Int'l, Inc. v.

Auditing Div. . 814 P. 2d 581, 588 (Utah 1991). This Court need
not defer to the Commission's application of the law to the
undisputed facts in this case.
In denying Bonneville's claim for refund of sales
tax, the Commission determined that—although Video West was
engaged in the "manufacture" of reproduced video tapes—it was
not a "manufacturing facility" within the meaning of the
statute.

The Commission reached that conclusion because it

determined that the manufacture of reproduced video tapes does
not fall within any of the "manufacturing" SIC Codes 2000 to
3999.

In so doing, the Commission rejected Bonneville's

argument that the reproduction of video tapes falls within SIC
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Code

3652

entitled

Magnetic

Tape"

"Phonograph

whose

Records

description

and
is

Pre-recorded
as

follows:

"Establishments primarily engaged in manufacturing phonograph
records and pre-recorded magnetic tape."
190.

SIC Manual 1972 at

Instead, the Commission concluded that Video West's

manufacture of reproduced video tapes more likely falls into
the SIC Code 7819, which contains the following description.
7819. Services Allied to Motion Picture Production
Establishments primarily engaged in performing
services independent of motion picture production
but allied thereto, such as motion picture film
processing, editing and titling; casting bureaus;
wardrobe and studio property rental; television
tape services (editing, transfers, etc.); and stock
footage film libraries.
SIC Manual 1972 at 315.

The sum total of the Commission's

reasoning was as follows: "The foregoing list of activities is
not exclusive and is broad enough to encompass video tape
reproduction. The 1987 SIC Manual specifically places 'motion
picture and video tape reproduction' in activity code 7819."
[Final Decision of Utah State Tax Commission dated September
3, 1992 at 5.]
The Commission's determination that Video West's
activities
precariously

fit

into

Code

7819

instead

of

on several erroneous premises.

3652 wobbles
First, the

Commission apparently relies on the "intent" of the drafters
of the

1972 SIC Manual by stating that

"the Commission

considers it unlikely that the drafters of the 1972 SIC Manual
intended

to include video tape reproduction

in the same

activity code as activities related to audio media such as
phonograph

records."

[Final

Commission

dated September

Decision

of Utah

3, 1992 at 4.]

State Tax
This intent

"reasoning" is wholly misplaced. The SIC Manual 1972 gives no
indication that its drafters had any intent at all regarding
the reproduction of video tapes.

In 1972, the video tape

reproduction industry did not exist, and the drafters of the
Manual clearly did not include video reproduction in any Code
description.

Moreover, the Commission's obsession with the

intent of the SIC Manual's drafters misses the point.

The

Legislature's reference to SIC Codes 2000 to 3999 does not
mean the Legislature intended to exclude certain manufacturers
from the exemption based on a hypertechnical reading of the
Code descriptions.
the

intent

behind

Thus, the Commission should ask not what
the

SIC

Code

was, but

rather, what

activities did the Utah State Legislature intend to include in
the exemption when it drafted Section 59-12-104(15).
A second flawed premise on which the Commission
relies is that the intent of those who drafted the 1987 SIC
Manual is somehow relevant in determining what the intent of
the 1972 Manual's drafters would have been.

This is evident

from the Commission's statement that its "interpretation of
the scope of activity code 3652 is supported by the fact that
the 1987 SIC Manual specifically limits activity code 3652 to
audio media."

[Id.] Although the drafters of the 1987 Manual

have indeed limited Code 3652 to audio media, this fact does
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not have any bearing on the proper interpretation of the 1972
Manual's

descriptions.

The

1972 Manual was drafted by

personnel at the Office of Management and Budget during the
Nixon Administration.

Those who drafted the 1987 Manual

during the Reagan administration, are undoubtedly a different
group whose actions tell nothing of the intent behind the 1972
Manual.
In support

of

its decision

that

Video West's

activities fall within Code 7819, the Commission's third
infirm premise is that "[t]he 1987 SIC Manual specifically
places

'motion

picture

activity code 7819."

and

video

tape

reproduction' in

[Id.] As discussed above, however, the

language of the 1987 Manual is irrelevant on this point.
Indeed,

the

fact

that

the drafters

of the

1987 Manual

recognized a need to include a description including video
tape reproduction does not prove an intent on the part of the
1972 drafters, but rather the utter lack of any such intent
regarding video reproduction. Moreover, even though the 1987
Manual

includes in Code 7819 some mention of video tape

reproduction, this does not mean the 1987 Manual's drafters
intended that all facilities engaged in video reproduction are
engaged in a "service."

Clearly the reproduction of video

tapes can be either a service or manufacturing, depending on
the circumstances.

In the present case, the Commission does

not

Video

dispute

that

West's

activities are manufacturing.

video

tape

[Record at 67].

reproduction

Fourth, the Commission's determination that the
description in Code 7819 is more likely to include Video
West's activities than the description in Code 3652 is simply
not supported by the language of those descriptions. It is at
least as likely that Video West's manufacture of reproduced
video tapes fits within Code 3652. The language of Code 3652
in no way excludes video tape reproduction. Both the title of
Code 3652 and the language in the description use the phrase
"phonograph records and pre-recorded magnetic tape.11

The

Commission apparently assumes that the inclusion of the term
"phonograph records" in this phrase limits the description to
audio media.

However, nothing in the wording or punctuation

of that phrase so limits the use of the words "magnetic tape."
It is undisputed that Video West is engaged in the manufacture
of "pre-recorded magnetic tape."

The Commission expressly

indicated this in its "Findings of Fact" in which it found:
"4. The magnetic tape used by Bonneville Communications and
Video West in their respective operations is essentially the
same material."

[Final Decision of Utah State Tax Commission

dated September 3, 1992 at 2.]
In contrast, the activities described in Code 7819
do not include modern-day videocassette reproduction.

Code

7819 describes traditional Hollywood-style movie making. This
activity, and the service activities that were allied to movie
making

in 1972, are a far cry

from the manufacture of

duplicate videocassettes today.
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Finally, the Commission erred by concluding that
the description contained in Code 7819, a service Code, is
more likely to include the manufacture of video reproductions
than Code 3652, which is a manufacturing Code.

In reaching

its decision, the Commission chose to ignore the fact that
Code 7819 is contained in Division I of the Manual, which is
entitled "Services," while Code 3652 is included in Division
D entitled "Manufacturing." If any intent can be gleaned from
the 1972 Manual, it must be that the drafters of the Manual
contemplated that the descriptions contained in Division I
would

include

only

the

rendition

of

services,

not

the

manufacture of tangible goods. Thus, even if the Commission's
methodology is correct, the Commission should have opted for
the SIC Code that is clearly a "manufacturing" code instead of
the "service" code that it chose.
III. The Commission Has Abused Its Discretion. If Any Has
Been Granted. To Interpret Section 59-12-104(15).
A.

The Legislature Did Not Grant the Commission
Discretion in the Interpretation of the
Statute.
There is nothing in the language of Section 59-12-

104(15) that expressly grants the Commission any discretion in
the

interpretation

and/or

application

of

the

terms

"manufacturer" and "manufacturing facility" for purposes of
the exemption.

See supra note 1.

Bonneville recognizes,

however, that the Legislature may implicitly grant an agency
some discretion in interpreting statutory terms.

The Legislature, in many instances, has
explicitly granted agencies discretion in dealing
with specific statutory terms. Apart from such
explicit grants of authority, courts have also
recognized that grants of discretion may be implied
from the statutory language. For example, we have
held that when the operative terms of a statute are
broad and generalized, these terms "bespeak a
legislative intent to delegate their interpretation
to the responsible agency.11 We have also granted
an agency's statutory interpretation deference when
the legislature had left the specific question at
issue unresolved.
Morton Int'l. Inc. v. Auditing Div.. 814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah
1991).
In this case, the language at issue does not
explicitly grant discretion to the Commission in interpreting
the

terms

"manufacturer"

Moreover,

there

implicitly

is

granted

no

and

"manufacturing

indication

discretion

interpreting those terms.

that

to

the

the

facility."
Legislature

Commission

in

The language of Section 59-12-

104(15) is not "broad and generalized," but is specific.
Although the Commission will undoubtedly

argue that its

decision should be given deference, there is nothing in the
statute

to

support

the

notion

that

the

Commission

has

discretion to determine the proper meaning of the statute.
B.

Even if this Court Finds that the Commission
Has
Been
Given
Sprnq
Piscyetipq, £fcg
Commissions Decision Constitutes an Abuse of

that pigcyetjon.
Even

if the Commission

has been granted some

discretion, the Commission has abused that discretion based on
the record in this case.

Under the UAPA, relief may be
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granted

"if, on the basis of the agency's record,

[the

appellate court] determines that - . . ( h ) the agency action
is (i) an abuse of discretion delegated to the agency by
statute," Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1989). As the Utah
Supreme Court has held, "an agency has abused its discretion
when the agency's action, viewed
language

and

purpose

unreasonable."

of

the

in the context of the
governing

statute,

is

Morton, 814 P.2d at 587; see also Mor-Flo

Indus.. Inc. v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Utah Ct. App.
1991).
As set forth above, the Legislature undoubtedly
enacted the sales tax exemption in Section 59-12-104(15) for
the

purpose

of

encouraging

facilities in Utah.

investment

in

manufacturing

Thus, any reading of the statute that

runs directly contrary to the purpose of the exemption would
be unreasonable

and, therefore, an abuse of discretion.

Morton. 814 P. 2d at 587. Yet, the Commission's interpretation
of Section 59-12-104(15) in this case runs directly contrary
to the purpose of that exemption.
affirmatively

acknowledged

that

Indeed, the Commission has
Video

West's

activities

constitute the manufacture of reproduced video tapes. [Record
at

67].

In the

face of that concession, however, the

Commission has interpreted that statute in such a way as to
deny the exemption to Video West, thereby removing any tax
incentive

toward

investment

facilities in Utah.

in

new

video

manufacturing

Thus, viewed in the context of the

language

and

purpose

of

the

statute,

the

Commission's

interpretation is unreasonable and constitutes an abuse of
discretion that must be reversed,
COpciffgjON
The Commission erred in interpreting the meaning
and scope of the terms "manufacturer11 and "manufacturing
facility" as used in Utah Code Ann, § 59-12-104(15), thus its
decision must be reversed on that basis.

Moreover, even if

the Commission's interpretation were correct, the Commission's
application of its own interpretation of the statute to the
facts of this case is erroneous. Finally, the Commission has
abused its discretion, if any exists, in interpreting the
meaning

and

scope of Section

59-12-104(15), because the

Commission's interpretation is unreasonable in light of the
context

and purpose of that

statute.

Accordingly, the

Commission's decision denying Bonneville's claim for refund of
sales taxes paid on purchases of Video West equipment should
be reversed.

27

DATED this

7

day of January, 1993.

BONNEVILLE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION

Boyd J.
Attorney

:ms
Petitioner

KIMBALL, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE

Brian C Johnson
Scott R. Ryther
Co-counsel for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies
of the foregoing Brief of Petitioner were hand delivered this
day of January, 1993, to the following:
Brian L. Tarbet, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State Street, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

